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Abstract 
In response to the 2007–09 Global Financial Crisis, in October 2008, the Italian government 
announced urgent measures to guarantee financial stability and the flow of credit. The 
Italian government targeted three areas of support: (1) bank recapitalizations, (2) liquidity 
access, and (3) expansion of guarantees on bank deposits. This case study exclusively 
examines the Italian bank recapitalization scheme introduced in December 2008 in line 
with European Union State Aid rules. 
The four Italian banks recapitalized in 2009 under the scheme were Banco Popolare 
(€1.45 billion), Banca Popolare di Milano (€500 million), Credito Valtellinese (€200 
million), and Banca Montepaschi di Siena (€1.9 billion), for an overall amount of €4.05 
billion. The government purchased special bonds issued by banks. These bonds became 
known as “Tremonti bonds,” and Italian regulators agreed to treat them as core Tier 1 
regulatory capital. 
Keywords: banks, capital injections, financial crisis, Italy, recapitalization, Tremonti bonds 
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 At a Glance 
The 2007–2009 Global Financial Crisis 
prompted governments around the 
world to take unprecedented actions. On 
October 9, 2008, the Italian government 
issued Decree-Law N. 155, on urgent 
measures to guarantee the stability of 
the financial system and the continued 
flow of credit. It targeted three areas of 
support: bank recapitalizations, greater 
access to liquidity, and expanded 
guarantees on bank deposits. Decree-
Law N. 185/2008 became the legal basis 
of the Italian bank recapitalization 
scheme. 
The Italian Ministry of Economy and 
Finance recapitalized four banks in 2009 
by the purchase of special bonds, known 
as “Tremonti bonds,” to strengthen the 
banks’ balance sheets. Despite 
speculations, the two largest Italian 
banks, Intesa Sanpaolo and UniCredit, 
did not participate in the scheme. 
Italian regulators deemed the Tremonti 
bonds as core Tier 1 regulatory capital 
because they were perpetual, 
noncumulative, and convertible into 
common shares after three years. 
Participating banks had to adhere to a 
“code of ethics” regarding policies on 
executive compensation. They had to 
commit to increase lending to small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
contribute to the guarantee fund for 
loans granted to SMEs, suspend up to 12 
months of mortgage payments for homeowners, and ensure appropriate liquidity levels to 
creditors of public administrations. 
Summary Evaluation 
Italian authorities expressed that the Italian recapitalization scheme “exhibited satisfactory 
performance in its implementation, providing a safety net that corresponds well to market 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: “To restore stability of the financial system 
and to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of 
Italy” 
Announcement Date October 9, 2008 
Legal Authority Italian Decree-Law N. 
185/2008; 
EC Treaty, Article 87 (3)(b) 
Date of First Capital 
Injection  
July 31, 2009 
Last Date to Inject 
Capital 
December 31, 2009 
Program Size Initially, available funds were 
up to €15 billion–€20 billion. 
In February 2009, up to €12 
billion 
Participants Banco Popolare 
(€1.45 billion), Banca 
Popolare di Milano 
(€500 million), Credito 
Valtellinese (€200 million), 
and Banca Montepaschi di 
Siena (€1.9 billion) 
Usage €4.05 billion 
Administrator Italian Ministry of Economy 
and Finance 
Notable Features “Tremonti bonds,” code of 
ethics, commitments to lend 
to SMEs 
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needs and ensuring the provision of lending to the real economy” (EC 2010b). In February 
2010, Bank of Italy Governor Mario Draghi expressed that Italian banks were “well placed 
to cope with the international environment” (Draghi 2010a). Draghi noted that their capital 
bases were strengthened by the issue of shares, disposal of noncore assets, the ploughing 
back of profits and, in some cases, government interventions. With regard to the design of 
Tremonti bonds, a representative from the Bank of Italy pointed out that, in principle, 
instruments with standard, noncomplex features were preferable as they allowed for 
greater comparability, better pricing, and clearer loss-absorption mechanisms.  
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Italy Context 2008–2009 
GDP $2,410.9 billion in 2008 
GDP per capita $2,196.8 billion in 2009 
Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior 
debt) 
$40,778 in 2008 
$37,080 in 2009 









Size of banking system as a percentage of 
GDP 
107.3% in 2008 
114.2% in 2009 
Size of banking system as a percentage of 
financial system 
100% in 2008 
100% in 2009 
Five-bank concentration of banking system 62.5% of total banking assets in 
2008 
63.8% of total banking assets in 
2009 
Foreign involvement in banking system 6% of total banking assets in 
2008 
6% of total banking assets in 
2009 
Government ownership of banking system None 
Existence of deposit insurance Yes in 2008 
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I. Overview 
Background 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008, and the ensuing Global Financial 
Crisis, triggered unprecedented responses from governments around the world. In October 
2008, in a period of 10 days, multiple high-level government meetings took place in efforts 
to coordinate an international response and common measures to combat the crisis. The 
meetings included the European Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) on 
October 7, 2008; the Group of Seven (G7) summit in Washington, DC, on October 10; an 
emergency euro area summit of heads of state on October 12; and the Council of the 
European Union (European Council) meeting on October 15–16. 
The ECOFIN approved a set of principles and extraordinary measures for European 
governments to combat the crisis (ECOFIN 2008). The G7 finance ministers and central 
bank governors pledged to take aggressive actions that included: support for systemically 
important financial institutions, all necessary efforts to ensure credit access to banks, 
temporary guarantees on short- and medium-term liabilities, expansion of guarantees on 
bank deposits, bank recapitalization through the use of public funds, and acquisition of 
illiquid assets (G7 2008). 
The euro area heads of state released the “Declaration on a Concerted European Action 
Plan of the Euro Area Countries,” which committed efforts to reestablish confidence and 
the well-functioning of the financial system. In agreement with the European Commission 
(EC) and the European Central Bank (ECB), the plan outlined support to financial 
institutions by facilitating: (a) appropriate liquidity conditions, (b) funding of banks, (c) 
additional capital resources, (d) recapitalizations of distressed banks, (e) flexibility in the 
implementation of accounting rules, and (f) cooperation among European countries (Euro 
Summit 2008). A few days later, the European Council endorsed the plan of action and 
extended it to all countries part of the European Union (EU) (European Council 2008). 
Italy, on October 9, 2008, issued Decree-Law N. 155, “Urgent Measures to Guarantee the 
Stability of the Credit System and the Continued Flow of Credit to Firms and Consumers in 
the Current State of Crisis in World Financial Markets.” The decree envisaged a government 
package focused on three areas of support to the Italian banking sector: (a) bank 
recapitalizations, (b) access to liquidity, and (c) expanded guarantees on bank deposits 
(Bank of Italy 2008). This case study exclusively examines the Italian bank recapitalization 
scheme. 
At the time, Italy held a large and increasing public debt (estimated at 105% of GDP in 
2008). Italian banks’ interest rate spreads over Italian government bonds had widened 
significantly in the past year. The head of the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance 
(MEF), Giulio Tremonti, expressed that Italy, unlike other European countries, could not 
pursue a major fiscal stimulus through deficits or debt increases. However, Tremonti 
remained confident that the Italian financial system was in better condition than those of 
other European countries, as Italian banks relied on more traditional credit activities, such 
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as retail deposits and bonds, and less on complex securities such as in the US or the UK 
(Economist 2009). 
The reported aggregate Tier 1 capital ratio of the Italian banking system was 7.7% in 2007 
and 7.6% in 2008. For the five largest Italian banks, it was 6.4% in 2007 and 6.7% in 2008 
(see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Italian Banks—Capital Ratios in 2007 and 2008 
 
Source: Bank of Italy 2010. 
Program Description 
The legal bases for the Italian government’s support package were passed through a fast-
track procedure as Decree-Law N. 155/2008 on October 9, Decree-Law N. 157/2008 on 
October 13, and Decree-Law N. 185/2008 on November 29. These were converted into Law 
N. 190/2008 on December 4 and Law N. 2/2009 on January 28 (Bank of Italy 2009c).  
On November 20, 2008, the ECB published a recommendation on the pricing of bank 
recapitalizations by national governments. The EC released guidance on December 5 to 
ensure that recapitalizations through EU State Aid did not grant banks undue competitive 
advantages and financial stability was preserved in line with the rules of the single market. 
The EC guidance envisioned two types of recapitalizations: for “distressed” banks and for 
“fundamentally sound” banks. In principle, recapitalizations for distressed banks required 
stricter requirements (Bank of Italy 2009a; EC 2008c; ECB 2008). For sound banks, 
recapitalization allowed governments to acquire securities issued by the banks with an 
“appropriate” yield of between 7% and 9%. Higher yields could be considered in order to 
encourage banks to buy back the securities as market conditions improved (Bank of Italy 
2009a). 
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The legal basis for the Italian recapitalization scheme for sound banks was Article 12 of 
Decree-Law N. 185/2008, converted into Law N. 2/2009 (Bank of Italy 2009c; EC 2009c). 
The total available funds for the Italian recapitalization scheme was unspecified but 
expected to be between €15 and €20 billion (EC 2008d). Italian authorities made clear that 
support would be available “as needed” (Bank of Italy 2009d). In February 2009, when the 
scheme was amended, the size of the scheme was reported to be up to €12 billion (Reuters 
2009a). The €80 billion Italian economic stimulus plan announced on November 15, 2008, 
was considered low at an estimated 0.6% of GDP (Bank of Italy 2009d; Financial Times 
2008). 
On December 18, 2008, Italy notified the EC of its recapitalization scheme, which the EC 
approved on December 23, 2008, after intensive exchanges with Italian officials. The 
scheme was in line with EU State Aid rules, as a temporary measure and compatible with 
Article 87 (3)(b) of the EC Treaty, intended to “restore stability of the financial system and 
to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of Italy” (EC 2008d; EC 2008e). 
The MEF was empowered to recapitalize banks until December 31, 2009, conditional on a 
notification to the EC after six months on the need to prolong the scheme. Eligible 
institutions included fundamentally sound Italian banks (including subsidiaries of foreign 
banks) with shares listed on regulated markets. The criteria of fundamental soundness 
were based on a bank’s credit default swaps spread, ratings, and a complementary 
assessment by the Bank of Italy. The Bank of Italy assessed each bank’s solvency, capital 
adequacy, and risk profile (Bank of Italy 2009c; EC 2008e; EC 2009c). 
The scheme was expected to have its first operations by January 2009. However, in the first 
two months of the scheme, no bank participated. Then, in February 2009, the scheme was 
amended to offer an alternative option of remuneration. This change was intended to make 
the scheme more attractive to banks that expected to use the government capital for a 
short period. It consisted of higher annual coupons until 2014 in exchange for lower 
redemption prices fixed at nominal value until June 2013 (EC 2009a). On February 16, 
2009, Italy notified the EC of the amendment, which was approved on February 20, 2009. 
Three days later, Tremonti signed a ministerial decree to allow the government to 
recapitalize banks by buying “special bonds” from banks, considered as common equity 
Tier 1 (CET1) regulatory capital (EC 2009b). These bonds became known as “Tremonti 
bonds.”  
Italian regulators classified the Tremonti bonds as CET1 pursuant to the then applicable 
regulation EU Directive 2006/49/EC, as implemented at the national level (European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union 2006). The Tremonti bonds were perpetual 
and convertible into common shares after three years. The interest paid was 
noncumulative—paid only when a bank had distributable earnings, provided that the 
bank’s capital ratio was at least 8%. Remuneration included an initial coupon with fixed 
step-up clauses, increases in remuneration associated with dividend payments and 
financing costs of the government, and a redemption price premium that increased over 
time. Individual recapitalizations were limited to 2% of a bank’s risk-weighted assets, 
without surpassing an 8% Tier 1 capital ratio (Bank of Italy 2009b; EC 2008e; EC 2009a).  
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In 2014, Regulation (EU) 575/2013 (the Capital Requirements Regulation, or CRR), directly 
applicable to all European Union member states, replaced EU Directive 2006/49/EC, 
reflecting the standards set by Basel III after the Global Financial Crisis. The CRR set the 
new eligibility criteria for the instruments to be classified into the three layers of own 
funds: common equity Tier 1, additional Tier 1, and Tier 2, and it seemed difficult for the 
Tremonti bonds to qualify as CET1 under CRR (European Parliament and Council of the 
European Union 2013). 
Banks participating in the scheme had to adhere to a “code of ethics” for policies on 
executive compensation. Additionally, banks had to sign a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) in which they committed to: (a) increase lending for the next three years to small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs); (b) contribute to the guarantee fund for loans 
granted to SMEs; (c) suspend up to 12 months of mortgage payments for borrowers who 
lost their jobs or benefited from public income support; and (d) ensure appropriate 
liquidity levels to creditors of public administrations. Banks were required to provide 
aggregated data on a quarterly basis to enable monitoring of the application of the MoU 
(Bank of Italy 2009b; Bank of Italy 2009c). On July 31, 2009, Italy requested that the EC 
prolong its recapitalization scheme until December 31, 2009, which the EC approved (EC 
2009c). The scheme was reintroduced 10 months after the original expiration date, on 
October 23, 2010, and ended December 31, 2010 (EC 2010b). 
Outcomes 
By the end of 2009, when the Italian recapitalization scheme first expired, capital injections 
totaled €4.05 billion. The four participating banks included: Banco Popolare (BP) for 
€1.45 billion, Banca Popolare di Milano (BPM) for €500 million, Credito Valtellinese 
(Creval) for €200 million, and Banca Montepaschi di Siena (MPS) for €1.9 billion (see 
Figure 2). 











Banca Popolare di 
Milano (BPM) 
500,000,000 Dec. 4, 
2009 
Jun 30, 2013 
Credito Valtellinese 
(Creval) 
200,000,000 Dec. 30, 
2009 
Jun 13, 2013 
Montepaschi di Siena 
(MPS) 
1,900,000,000 Dec. 30, 
2009 
 
Total 4,050,000,000   
Source: EC 2010b. 
The announcement of the Tremonti bond decree in late February 2009 was accompanied 
with the speculation that the two largest Italian banks, UniCredit and Intesa Sanpaolo, 
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would participate in government recapitalizations, each one for an amount of €3 billion 
(Reuters 2009a). 
However, by May 2009, no recapitalization had taken place under the scheme. Tremonti 
expressed that banks had been too “relaxed” about using the recapitalization scheme. In 
May, four institutions reportedly requested around €6 billion from the Italian scheme: 
UniCredit, Banco Popolare, Banca Popolare di Milano, and Banca Montepaschi di Siena. 
UniCredit’s chief executive said that the bank planned to seek up to €4 billion in capital 
support from government programs in Austria and Italy (Mayer Brown 2009; Reuters 
2009b). 
Despite continuous speculation, UniCredit and Intesa Sanpaolo did not participate in the 
scheme and instead sought to raise capital through private investors, seemingly to avoid 
government demands on lending. At the end of September 2009, UniCredit had a core Tier 
1 capital ratio of 7.5%, while Intesa Sanpaolo’s ratio was 7.2% (Reuters 2009c). 
All four banks that the Italian government recapitalized agreed to a code of ethics for 
policies on executive compensation and signed an MoU committing to support SMEs and 
homeowners. Banco Popolare, the first bank recapitalized, announced in early March 2009 
that it had formally requested that the MEF and the Bank of Italy approve the issuance of 
€1.45 billion in Tremonti bonds (BP 2009a; BP 2009b). The request was approved in mid-
June 2009, and the bonds were issued at the end of July 2009. The bank committed to an 
increase of 6% on loans to SMEs over the next three years and a €21.75 million 
contribution to the guarantee fund for loans granted to SMEs (BP 2009c; BP 2009d). In 
March 2011, Banco Popolare completed redemption of the Tremonti bonds and paid €86.4 
million on accrued interest payments between July 2010 and March 2011. The bank 
reported that Tremonti bonds contributed to an increase in lending to households by 9% in 
2009 and 7.2% by September 2010. For SMEs, the increase was 5% in 2009, and 7.1% by 
September 2010 (BP 2011). 
Banca Popolare di Milano announced in late March 2009 its intention to issue €500 million 
in Tremonti bonds after reporting a 77% slide in annual profits (Mayer Brown 2009). In 
September 2009, the bank reached an agreement with the MEF and expected the injection 
to raise its core Tier 1 ratio from 6.2% to 7.6% (Financial Times 2009). The bonds were 
issued in early December 2009, and the bank completed the redemption of the Tremonti 
bonds in June 2013 (BPM 2009; BPM 2013). Credito Valtellinese issued €200 million in 
Tremonti bonds on December 30, 2009. The bank committed to increase loans to SMEs by 
4% (Creval 2009). In June 2013, the bank completed redemption of the Tremonti bonds 
(Creval 2013). 
Banca Montepaschi di Siena announced in March 2009 that it would issue €1.9 billion in 
Tremonti bonds. In August 2009, the Bank of Italy gave the bank the green light to 
negotiate the terms of the bond issuance with the MEF. By the end of June 2009, MPS’s Tier 
1 capital ratio stood at 5.8% but was expected to increase to 7.3% after the recapitalization 
(Italian News 2009). The MEF approved the issue of Tremonti bonds in mid-December 
2009 and injected the capital on December 30, 2009. The MoU included an estimated 4.5% 
increase in loans to SMEs. This was an additional €10 billion a year for SMEs for the next 
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two years, on top of the €70.2 billion disbursed, on average, in the previous two years. 
Additionally, the bank committed to contribute €28.5 million to the guarantee fund for 
loans to SMEs (MPS 2009). 
In 2009, banking lending to SMEs contracted generally across the banking sector, although 
less markedly by the four banks receiving Tremonti bonds, which recorded a larger 
contraction in overall loans. In 2010, these four banks recorded a 5% increase in lending to 
SMEs in comparison to other banks, again with a slight decline in overall loans (Bartiloro et 
al. 2012). 
In late May 2009, Moody’s downgraded the Italian banking sector from stable to negative. 
While it expected a deterioration in asset quality and profits, it determined that Italian 
banks were unlikely to require “strong government backing,” due to less exposure to toxic 
assets, investment activities, and capital market funding. A week later, Standard & Poor’s 
also forecasted an increase in loan losses and nonperforming assets in Italian banks 
through 2010 (Mayer Brown 2009).  
By September 2009, the core Tier 1 capital ratio of the largest Italian banks reached 7.3% 
and by March 2010, 7.6% (Draghi 2010a; Draghi 2010b; see Figure 3). It was generally 
lower than the ratios of other major European banks. However, Bank of Italy Governor 
Mario Draghi explained that the differences laid in the substantial public recapitalizations 
abroad and the more stringent criteria used in Italy to classify regulatory capital. Governor 
Draghi emphasized that the largest Italian banks held high-quality capital and were less 
leveraged compared to other major European banks. Nonetheless, through 2009 and 2010, 
Draghi continued to stress the importance of strengthening capital ratios. In a speech in 
July 2009, he expressed: 
I have said, and I say again, that a strengthening is nonetheless necessary. It is not just 
a question of maintaining strong safeguards for stability; we must compete on an equal 
footing with the foreign banks which have had to resort to massive injections of public 
money in recent months; we must be prepared, as of now, to operate with a capital 
endowment that future regulations will require to be larger than at present. Above all, 
capital strengthening is indispensable in order to face the deterioration in the 
macroeconomic situation without neglecting to give firms, households and the 
economy the support they need (Draghi 2009).  
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Figure 3: Italian Banks—Capital Ratios in 2008 and 2009 
 
Source: Bank of Italy 2011. 
II. Key Design Decisions 
1. The Italian recapitalization scheme was part of a package in response to the 
Global Financial Crisis (2007–2009). 
On October 9, 2008, Italy issued Decree-Law N. 155, “Urgent Measures to Guarantee the 
Stability of the Credit System and the Continued Flow of Credit to Firms and Consumers in 
the Current State of Crisis in World Financial Markets.” The decree envisaged a government 
support package focused on three areas: (1) recapitalizations, (2) access to liquidity, and 
(3) expanded guarantees on bank deposits (Bank of Italy 2008). The €80 billion Italian 
economic stimulus plan announced on November 15, 2008, was considered low at an 
estimated 0.6% of GDP (Bank of Italy 2009d, 5; Financial Times 2008). 
2. The Italian Decree-Law N. 185/2008, later converted into Law N. 2/2009, was the 
legal basis for the Italian recapitalization scheme.  
The legal basis for the Italian recapitalization scheme for sound banks was Article 12 of 
Decree-Law N. 185 of November 29, 2009, converted into Law N. 2/2009 on January 28, 
2009 (Bank of Italy 2009c). 
3. The European Commission approved the Italian recapitalization scheme under 
EU State Aid rules compatible with the EC Treaty. 
On December 18, 2008, Italy notified the European Commission of its recapitalization 
scheme. The EC approved it on December 23, 2008, after intensive exchanges with Italian 
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officials. The scheme was in line with EU State Aid rules, as a temporary measure and 
compatible with Article 87 (3)(b) “intended to stabilize the markets as a response to the 
global financial crisis” (EC 2008d; EC 2008e). 
The government expected the scheme to have its first operations by January 2009. 
However, with no use of the scheme, on February 16, 2009, Italy notified the EC of an 
amendment, which was approved on February 20, 2009. The amendment became 
operational on February 25, 2009, with an Italian ministerial decree. On July 31, 2009, Italy 
requested that the EC prolong its recapitalization scheme until December 31, 2009, which 
was approved in October 2009 (EC 2009c). Ten months after its expiration, the scheme was 
reintroduced, on October 23, 2010, and ran until December 31, 2010 (EC 2010b). 
4. Italy and other countries communicated government interventions to contain 
the financial crisis. 
In October 2008, in a period of 10 days, multiple high-level government meetings took 
place intended to coordinate an international response and establish common measures to 
combat the crisis. The meetings included the ECOFIN on October 7, 2008; the G7 summit in 
Washington, DC, on October 10; an emergency euro area summit of heads of state on 
October 12; and the European Council meeting on October 15–16. 
The euro area heads of state released the “Declaration on a Concerted European Action 
Plan of the Euro Area Countries,” which committed efforts to reestablish confidence and 
promote the sound functioning of the financial system. In agreement with the EC and the 
European Central Bank, the plan outlined support to financial institutions by facilitating: 
(a) appropriate liquidity conditions, (b) funding of banks, (c) additional capital resources, 
(d) recapitalizations of distressed banks, (e) flexibility in the implementation of accounting 
rules, and (f) cooperation among European countries (Euro Summit 2008). A few days 
later, the European Council endorsed the plan of action and extended it to all countries part 
of the European Union (European Council 2008). 
By September 2009, the core Tier 1 capital ratio of the largest Italian banks reached 7.3% 
and by March 2010, 7.6% (Draghi 2010a; Draghi 2010b; see Figure 3). It was generally 
lower than the ratios of other major European banks. However, Bank of Italy Governor 
Mario Draghi explained that the differences laid in the substantial public recapitalizations 
abroad and the more stringent criteria used in Italy to classify regulatory capital. Governor 
Draghi emphasized that the largest Italian banks held high-quality capital and were less 
leveraged compared to other major European banks. Nonetheless, through 2009 and 2010, 
Draghi continued to stress the importance of strengthening capital ratios. In a speech in 
July 2009, he expressed: 
I have said, and I say again, that a strengthening is nonetheless necessary. It is not just 
a question of maintaining strong safeguards for stability; we must compete on an equal 
footing with the foreign banks which have had to resort to massive injections of public 
money in recent months; we must be prepared, as of now, to operate with a capital 
endowment that future regulations will require to be larger than at present. Above all, 
capital strengthening is indispensable in order to face the deterioration in the 
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macroeconomic situation without neglecting to give firms, households and the 
economy the support they need” (Draghi 2009). 
5. The Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance managed the recapitalization 
scheme with support from the Bank of Italy. 
The Ministry of Economy and Finance was empowered to inject capital in eligible 
institutions until December 31, 2009. The Bank of Italy assessed each bank’s solvency, 
capital adequacy, and risk profile. 
6. Initially, the size of the recapitalization scheme was between €15 billion and 
€20 billion. In February 2009, with the introduction of the Tremonti bonds, the 
size was reported to be up to €12 billion. 
The total available funds for the Italian recapitalization scheme was unspecified but 
expected to be between €15 billion and €20 billion (EC 2008d). Italian authorities made 
clear that support would be available “as needed” (Bank of Italy 2009d). In February 2009, 
when the scheme was amended, the size of the scheme was reported to be up to €12 billion 
(Reuters 2009a). 
7. Eligible institutions included fundamentally sound Italian banks (including 
subsidiaries of foreign banks) with shares listed in the regulated markets. 
Eligible institutions included fundamentally sound Italian banks (including subsidiaries of 
foreign banks) with shares listed in the regulated markets. The Bank of Italy determined if 
a bank was fundamentally sound by considering available risk indicators. These included: 
spreads on credit default swaps on subordinated debt (median value not to exceed 100 
basis points in the period from January 2007 to August 2008), credit ratings of at least A-, 
and a complementary assessment by the Bank of Italy (Bank of Italy 2009b; EC 2008c). 
In late 2009, when the scheme was prolonged, Italy made additional commitments: 
(a) To inform the EC, at the moment of the recapitalization, of a bank’s risk profile to 
enable the EC to evaluate its viability and assess whether the bank was 
fundamentally sound or required restructuring. The material included a review 
from the Bank of Italy on the soundness and viability of the bank. The EC was 
provided with any additional information for its assessment of the bank’s viability. 
Italy committed to submit within six months the relevant information for each bank 
recapitalized to enable the EC to review the bank’s risk profile and viability so that it 
could assess if it could still be considered fundamentally sound. 
(b) When a bank applied for a second recapitalization, Italy submitted an individual 
notification. The EC assessed whether the bank was still considered fundamentally 
sound or if it required restructuring (EC 2009c). 
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8. Recapitalizations consisted of Tremonti bonds, which were perpetual and 
convertible into common shares after three years. 
The Italian government, through the MEF, acquired special bonds known as Tremonti 
bonds, to support banks’ balance sheets. For some commentators, the fact that banks paid 
interest on the bonds gave the scheme a more market-orientated feel compared to other 
European schemes in which banks were nationalized (Markit 2009). The Tremonti bonds 
were designed to have the same characteristics as common shares in order to qualify as 
core Tier 1 capital. They had the same degree of subordination and same ability to absorb 
losses, both in case of insolvency or when losses reduced total capital ratios below the 
regulatory minimum of 8%.  
Tremonti bonds were perpetual and convertible into common shares after three years. 
Interest was noncumulative and paid only if there were distributable earnings, provided 
the total capital ratio was at least 8%. Public bank recapitalizations were limited to 2% of a 
bank’s risk-weighted assets, without surpassing an 8% Tier 1 capital ratio (Bank of Italy 
2009b). 
Banks could redeem the Tremonti bonds, given authorization by the Bank of Italy, by 
paying a premium on the face value, which could increase over time in relation to the 
market value of the bank’s shares. The conversion ratio of Tremonti bonds into shares was 
fixed based on the average share price of the last 10 trading days before the issue (Bank of 
Italy 2009b). 
9. Remuneration and redemption conditions on Tremonti bonds were revised to 
encourage participation in the recapitalization scheme. 
The remuneration conditions were designed in line with EU State Aid rules to be 
temporary, to encourage an early exit. The EC recommended an indicative range based on 
the type of instrument. For subordinated debt, such as preferred shares, the EC 
recommended an average required rate of return of 7%. For common shares, the EC 
recommended an average required rate of return of 9.3% (EC 2008c). 
The conditions aimed to ensure an adequate remuneration for the government and protect 
the interests of taxpayers. Additionally, to minimize distortive effects of recapitalizations, 
remuneration included an initial coupon with fixed step-up clauses, increases in 
remuneration associated with dividend payments and the government’s financing costs, 
and a redemption price premium that increased over the years. To encourage early 
redemption by banks once the crisis was over, the redemption price was set higher than 
the nominal value and increased over time (see Figure 4) (Bank of Italy 2009b; EC 2008d; 
EC 2008e). 
When the recapitalization scheme was introduced in December 2008, the Italian 
government set the annual rate of return on the bonds at 7.5% for the first six months. 
Thereafter, it was the highest of these three options: 
(a) A predetermined annual coupon, increasing over time: 7.5% in 2009, 7.75% in 
2010, 8% in 2011, 8.25% in 2012, and 8.5% in 2013–2014. Then, it rose in 
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increments of 0.5% every two years (9% in 2015–2016, 9.5% in 2017–2018, etc.), 
up to 15% in 2039; 
(b) An amount equal to the product of the dividend per share distributed to common 
shareholders and the number of shares. This amount rose by an increasing 
percentage over time: 105% of dividends—in whatever capacity and in any form 
paid—in relation to 2009 profits, 110% for 2010, 115% for 2011–2017, and 125% 
for 2018 and following years; or 
(c) The average yield on 30-year Italian Treasury bonds (buoni del Tesoro poliennali, or 
BTPs) increased by a spread. Starting in 2011, the yield at the issuance of the 30-
year BTP increased by 300 basis points, then, starting in 2013, the 30-year BTP yield 
increased by 350 basis points (EC 2008e). 
For the second option introduced in February 2009, the interest rate was higher, starting at 
8.5%. Thereafter, the interest rate was the highest of the following three elements: 
(a) A predetermined annual coupon, increasing over time: 8.5% in 2009–2012, 9% in 
2013–2016, and then rising in increments of 0.5% every two years (9.5% for 2017–
2018 and so forth, up to 15% for 2039); 
(b) An amount equal to the product of the dividend per share distributed to common 
shareholders and the number of shares. This amount rose by an increasing 
percentage over time: 105% of the dividend—in any capacity and in any form 
paid—in relation to 2009 profits, 110% in 2010, 115% for 2011–2017, and 125% 
for 2018 and following years, with a maximum limit of 15% of the nominal value; or 
(c) The average yield on 30-year BTPs increased by a spread. Starting in 2011, the 
issuing yield of the 30-year BTPs increased by 300 basis points, then, starting in 
2013 and for the following years, the 30-year BTP yield increased by 350 basis 
points (EC 2009b). 
Additionally, provisions were in place whereby the government could accept a lesser 
remuneration, but only in cases where at least 30% of the bank’s issuance was subscribed 
by private investors (at least two-thirds other than shareholders owning 2% or more of the 
share capital) on equal terms with the Italian government. In any case, the yield had to be 
at least 200 basis points above the average yield of 30-year BTPs (Bank of Italy 2009b; EC 
2009a). 
For the first option, the redemption price was the higher of 110% of the nominal value at 
issuance or the market value of the bank shares in circulation. The redemption price was 
set within a percentage value of the nominal value equal to 120% in the event of 
redemption by June 30, 2013; 130% between July 1, 2013, and June 30, 2016; 140% 
between July 1, 2016, and June 30, 2019; 150% between July 1, 2019, and June 30, 2022; 
and 160% in case of redemption from July 1, 2022, onwards (EC 2008e). 
For the second option, the redemption price was set within a percentage value of the 
nominal value equal to 100% in the event of redemption by June 30, 2013, and 110% in the 
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event of redemption between July 1, 2013, and June 30, 2015. For the following years, the 
redemption price was set as the higher of: 110% of the nominal value of the Tremonti 
bonds at issuance or the market value of the bank shares in circulation, with a maximum 
limited to a percentage of the nominal value equal to 130% in the event of redemption 
between July 1, 2015, and June 30, 2016; 140% between July 1, 2016, and June 30, 2019; 
150% between July 1, 2019, and June 30, 2022; and 160% from July 1, 2022, onwards (EC 
2009b). 
EC Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes mentioned that “The Italian authorities have 
asked permission to modify the design of their scheme to make it more attractive to sound 
banks that are willing to use the state capital only for a very short period of time” (EC 
2009a). The first option of remuneration consisted of lower coupon payments and higher 
redemption prices up to 2014, while the second option consisted of an alternative 
remuneration option with a higher initial coupon and a higher annual level of the coupon 
until 2014. Starting in 2015, the two schemes had identical characteristics (see Figure 4).
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Figure 4: Tremonti Bonds—the Two Options for Remuneration 
Source: Bank of Italy 2009b. 
10. Banks recapitalized had to sign a Memorandum of Understanding and commit to 
a code of ethics and lending to SMEs and households. 
Banks participating in the government recapitalizations had to adhere to a code of ethics 
for policies on executive compensation. Additionally, banks had to sign a Memorandum of 
Understanding, that committed to: (a) increase lending for the next three years to small 
and medium-sized enterprises; (b) contribute to the guarantee fund for loans granted to 
SMEs; (c) suspend up to 12 months of mortgage payments for borrowers who lost their 
jobs or benefited from public income support; and (d) ensure appropriate liquidity levels to 
creditors of public administrations. 
The commitments of the MoU remained valid until the bank redeemed the Tremonti bonds 
to the government. Banks were required to provide aggregated data on a quarterly basis to 
enable monitoring of compliance. The Bank of Italy assessed the bank’s compliance with 
capital requirements (i.e., Tier 1) and its profitability. In line with the EU State Aid 
guidelines, limits were set on the expansion of a bank’s assets, and additional conditions 
were set to prevent banks from misusing public support (Bank of Italy 2009a; Bank of Italy 
2009b). 
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III. Evaluation 
In 2010, Italian authorities expressed that the Italian recapitalization scheme “exhibited 
satisfactory performance in its implementation, providing a safety net that corresponds 
well to market needs and ensuring the provision of lending to the real economy” (EC 
2010b).  
The core Tier 1 capital ratio of the largest Italian banks stood at 5.8% by the end of 2008 
and increased in the first three months of 2009 (Draghi 2009; Draghi 2010a). Premiums on 
credit default swaps had risen, but announcements by major Italian banks of their intention 
to use the recapitalization scheme and increases in profits contributed to reduction of the 
premiums by more than half (Bank of Italy 2009c). 
In February 2010, Italy’s central bank Governor Mario Draghi expressed that Italian banks 
were “well placed to cope with the international environment.” Draghi noted that their 
capital bases were strengthened by the issue of shares, disposal of noncore assets, the 
ploughing back of profits, and in some cases, government interventions (Draghi 2010a). 
The scheme expired on December 31, 2009; however, it was reintroduced 10 months later, 
on October 23, 2010, and ran until December 31, 2010. The Italian government cited 
protracted effects of the Global Financial Crisis and recent results of stress tests performed 
by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (EC 2010a; EC 2010b). 
In light of the new regulatory framework applied to all EU member countries in 2014 on 
capital requirements, as of this writing, it seems very difficult that the Tremonti bonds 
could be considered eligible as common equity Tier 1 (CET1) and additional Tier 1 (AT1) 
instruments, due to their remuneration features incentivizing early redemption and usage 
for only a short period (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2013). A 
representative from the Bank of Italy, in discussing the features of the Tremonti bonds, 
pointed out that, in principle, instruments with standard, noncomplex features were 
preferable for capital injection as they allowed for greater comparability, better pricing, 
and clearer loss-absorption mechanisms. 
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VI. Appendix: Timeline 
Date Event Description 
Oct./07/2008 The European Economic 
and Financial Affairs 
Council (ECOFIN) met to 
plan a response to the 
global financial crisis 
The ECOFIN approved a set of principles and 
extraordinary measures for European 
governments to combat the crisis (ECOFIN 
2008). 
Oct./09/2008 Italy issued Decree-Law 
N. 155. 
Decree-Law N. 155, “Urgent Measures to 
Guarantee the Stability of the Credit System 
and the Continued Flow of Credit to Firms and 
Consumers in the Current State of Crisis in 
World Financial Markets.” The decree 
envisaged a government package focused on 
three areas of support to the Italian banking 
sector: (a) bank recapitalizations, (b) access to 
liquidity, and (c) expanded guarantees on 
bank deposits (Bank of Italy 2008). 
Oct./10/2008 Group of Seven (G7) 
summit convened in 
Washington DC. 
The G7 finance ministers and central bank 
governors pledged to take aggressive actions 
that included: support for systemically 
important financial institutions, all necessary 
efforts to ensure credit access to banks, 
temporary guarantees on short- and medium-
term liabilities, expansion of guarantees on 
bank deposits, bank recapitalization through 
the use of public funds, and acquisition of 
illiquid assets (G7 2008). 
Oct./12/2008 Euro summit of heads of 
state held in Paris. 
The euro area heads of state released the 
“Declaration on a Concerted European Action 
Plan of the Euro Area Countries,” which 
committed efforts to reestablish confidence 
and the well-functioning of the financial 
system. In agreement with the European 
Commission (EC) and the European Central 
Bank (ECB), the plan outlined support to 
financial institutions by facilitating: (a) 
appropriate liquidity conditions, (b) funding 
of banks, (c) additional capital resources, (d) 
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recapitalizations of distressed banks, (e) 
flexibility in the implementation of accounting 
rules, and (f) cooperation among European 
countries (Euro Summit 2008). 




The European Commission provided guidance 
on the application of State Aid measures for 
banks in the context of the Global Financial 
Crisis. 
It highlighted that recapitalization schemes 
were important measures member states 
could take to preserve financial stability and 
proper functioning of financial markets (EC 
2008a; EC 2008b). 
Oct./15-
16/2008 
The Council of the 
European Union 
(European Council) met 
in Brussels. 
The European Council endorsed the plan of 
action and extended it to all countries part of 
the European Union (European Council 2008). 
Nov./20/2008 ECB released a 
recommendation on the 
pricing of bank 
recapitalizations. 
See ECB 2008. 
Nov./29/2008 Italy passes Decree-Law 
N. 185/2008 
Article 12 of Decree-Law N. 185 of November 
29, 2009 became the legal basis for the Italian 
recapitalization scheme. It was converted into 
Law N. 2/2009 on January 28, 2009 (Bank of 
Italy 2009c). 
Dec./02/2008 The ECOFIN anticipated 
the need for further 
recapitalizations. 
The ECOFIN expressed that it “recognized the 
need for further guidance for precautionary 
recapitalizations to sustain credit, and called 
for its urgent adoption by the European 
Commission” (EC 2008c).  
Dec./05/2008 The European 




 “The Recapitalisation of Financial Institutions 
in the Current Financial Crisis: Limitation of 
Aid to the Minimum Necessary and Safeguards 
against Undue Distortions of Competition” 
communication provided guidance for new 
recapitalization schemes and adjustments of 
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existing ones (EC 2008c). 
Dec./23/2008 The EC approved 
European Union (EU) 
State Aid case N 
648/2008. 
Recapitalization measures in favor of the 
Italian banking sector (EC 2008e). 
Feb./20/2009 The EC approved 
amendments to EU State 
Aid, case N 97/2009. 
The European Commission approved 
amendments to the Italian recapitalization 
scheme to offer a second offer of 
remuneration, more attractive for banks that 
planned to use the government capital for a 
short period (EC 2009b). 
July/31/2009 First capital injection 
and Italy’s request that 
the EC prolong its 
recapitalization scheme 
(EC 2009c). 
Banco Popolare (BP) became the first bank to 
receive a capital injection for €1.45 billion (EC 
2010b). 
Oct./06/2009 The EC approved a 
prolongation of the 
scheme until December 
31, 2009. State Aid case 
N 466/2009. 
See EC 2009c. 
Aug./05/2010 Italian Decree-Law N. 
125, Art. 2.1. Published 
in the Italian Official 
Journal 182. 
The passage became the legal basis for the 
Italian recapitalization scheme (EC 2010b). 
Oct./21/2010 EC approved the 
reintroduction of the 
Italian recapitalization 
scheme. State Aid case 
N. 425/2010. 
The scheme expired on December 31, 2009. 
Italy requested that the EC reintroduce the 
scheme until December 31, 2010 (EC 2010b). 
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